Electrical computers and digital processing systems: support – Multiple computer communication using cryptography – Central trusted authority provides computer authentication
Reexamination Certificate
1997-07-15
2003-06-24
Barron, Gilberto (Department: 2132)
Electrical computers and digital processing systems: support
Multiple computer communication using cryptography
Central trusted authority provides computer authentication
C713S157000, C713S158000, C713S178000
Reexamination Certificate
active
06584565
ABSTRACT:
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
1. Technical Field
The invention relates to the use of digital signatures. More particularly, the invention relates to a method and apparatus for the long term verification of digital signatures.
2. Description of the Prior Art
The technology of digital signatures opens up the likelihood of increased use of digital networks (including the Internet) for electronic commerce. It is now feasible to send and receive digitally signed documents that represent transactions of some value to one or more parties.
Currently, a digital signature is verifiable only as long as the digital certificates upon which it depends have not expired. Given the expectation that a certificate's life span is in the area of one to two years duration, current technology does not support the emerging needs of the electronic commerce market, where the durability of digital signatures over time is a requirement.
For certain applications, the recipient of digitally signed documents should be able to verify the authenticity of a document years after the document was signed, just as the document's authenticity can be verified at the time of signing. Unfortunately, the current state of the technology does not provide for the verification of these digital signatures after certificate expiration because it is the nature of keys and certificates used for signing and encrypting documents to expire after a specific period of time (typically after a year or two). This is due, at least in part, to the fact that the strength of keys is expected to degrade over time because of such factors as improvements in computing speed and breakthroughs in cryptoanalysis. Moreover, the longer the key is in use, the longer that an adversary has to attempt to crack the key. Therefore, it is standard practice to replace keys periodically. This is why certificates have specific expiration dates.
An examination of the current state of the technology reveals that a digital signature verification module would fail if presented with a request to verify a signed document in which any of the associated certificates had expired.
FIG. 1
is a block schematic diagram illustrating certification expiration. This simple example demonstrates that, given a certificate
10
having a two-year life span (e.g. from Apr. 1, 1996 to Apr. 1, 1998), a signature could be successfully verified six months (e.g. on Oct. 1, 1996) after certificate issuance (
100
); but this same signature would not be successfully verified three years later (e.g. on Apr. 1, 1999) (
102
). This behavior is clearly unacceptable if the duration of a document, for example contract, must extend beyond the duration of the certificates' life.
Further, some current systems use certificate revocation lists (CRLs) to revoke certificates and remove them therefrom, once those certificates expire. This means that a record of those CRLs generally disappears, making long term signature verification impossible using known techniques.
It is known to reconstruct past trust (see A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot, S. Vanstone,
Handbook of Applied Cryptography,
CRC Press, pp. 583 (1996)). In this approach, both signature reverification relative to a past point in time and resolution of disputes may require reconstruction of chains of trust from a past point in time. This requires archival of keying material and related information for reconstruction of past chains of trust. Direct reconstruction of such past chains is taught to be unnecessary if a notarizing agent is used. A notarizing agent is defined as a general service capable not only of ascertaining the existence of a document at a certain time, but of vouching for the truth of more general statements at certain points in time. The original verification of the notary is taught to establish the existence of a trust chain at that point in time, and subsequently its record thereof is taught to serve as proof of prior validity. It is taught that details of the original trust chain may be recorded for audit purposes. It is not taught that a document can be verified based upon the existence of expired certificates. Rather, reliance is placed upon the use of the notarizing agent. It is further taught that the archived keying material can be used as evidence at a future time to allow resolution of disputed signatures by non-automated procedures.
It would be advantageous to provide a technique for extending the time over which the authenticity and integrity of digital signatures can be accurately verified beyond the time that any relevant certificates expire.
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
The invention provides a method and apparatus which effectively extends the time over which a digital signature can be verified, i.e. well beyond the expiration of any or all of the certificates upon which that signature depends. The invention can be used for any application domain where users want digital signatures to be applied to long lasting documents (e.g. contracts), and be independently verifiable years or decades after signing the document. The preferred embodiment of the invention provides two alternative approaches to constructing a solution which delivers long term signature verification (LTSV).
One embodiment of the invention provides an approach for solving the LTSV problem that is referred to herein as the “save state” approach. This embodiment of the invention largely entails the use of cryptographic information and techniques. Thus, an archive facility is used to store the public key infrastructure (PKI) state, e.g. cryptographic information, such as certificates and CRLS, in addition to the document itself. This information comprises all that is necessary to re-create the signature verification process at a later time. It may also be desirable to store the source document separately from the cryptographic information (such as the signature, certificates, and CRLs) for reasons of privacy. For example, a user may want to have control over the source document. The PKI state information may contain either or both of cryptographically protected information, such as certificates and CRLs, and information that is not cryptographically protected, such as the public key of a root certification authority or policy information.
When a user wants to reverify the signature on a document, possibly years later, an LTSV server re-creates the precise state of the PKI at the time the document was originally submitted. The LTSV server restores the state, and the signature verification process executes the exact process it performed (or would have performed) years earlier. The time used as the basis for re-creation of the signature verification process does not have to be the time of submittal. Rather, the time could be some other relevant time, such as when a document was signed by the originator or when it was verified by a recipient.
Another embodiment of the invention combines the strength of cryptography with the proven resilience of (non-public key) technology and procedures currently associated with secure data stores. An example of this embodiment provides a mechanism that:
Saves the PKI state for future reverification; and
Protects the PKI state information from intrusion by either maintaining it in a secure storage facility which is protected by services, such as firewalls, access control mechanisms, audit facilities, intrusion detection facilities, physical isolation, and network isolation; and/or employing a cryptographic protection mechanism, for example using the LTSV server to sign the PKI state information or using a keyed hash algorithm.
In addition, other non-cryptographic features may be added to such approaches to deliver a highly secure and trusted LTSV solution, including, for example utilities for viewing the PKI state information (cryptographic as well as non-cryptographic) and visually monitoring the security of the system. These utilities can be used to provide visual evidence for purposes of dispute resolution.
One enhancement to the secure storage approach herein disclosed maintains certain evidence, such as
Barron Gilberto
Meislahn Douglas
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