Electrical computers and digital processing systems: support – Multiple computer communication using cryptography – Particular communication authentication technique
Reexamination Certificate
1999-10-21
2002-08-27
Hayes, Gail (Department: 2766)
Electrical computers and digital processing systems: support
Multiple computer communication using cryptography
Particular communication authentication technique
C713S156000
Reexamination Certificate
active
06442690
ABSTRACT:
FIELD OF THE INVENTION
The present invention relates generally to cryptography systems. More particularly, the present invention relates to an automated key management system that includes apparatus and methods for managing key material in heterogeneous cryptographic assets.
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
As an organization's need to provide confidentiality and authenticated access to a user's data increases, so does its need for cryptographic services. Cryptography provides a convenient way to ensure that data can be accessed (either remotely or locally) only by legitimate users with a valid “need to access,” and that this data is accessed in a manner that keeps its content private to all but the legitimate accessing party. As the number of cryptographic devices used within an organization grows, the management of the key material needed to operate these devices becomes more difficult. Moreover, the organization is typically required to perform both symmetric and asymmetric key management.
An example of an organization that requires secure management of key material for a heterogeneous set of cryptographic devices is a bank. Many banking customers require secure remote access to their account balances and authenticated requests for account withdrawals. The banks themselves must be able to wire money from institution to institution in a secure and authenticated manner. Data confidentiality, data integrity, and data authenticity are obvious security requirements supporting these banking services.
Cryptography and cryptographic techniques provide a vehicle for achieving data confidentiality, data integrity, and data authenticity. As cryptography and cryptographic techniques are implemented, key management naturally follows. Traditionally, key management has tended to be a unique “stove pipe” function implemented in each cryptographic system (e.g., a wire transfer system) as a unique dedicated key management system. The key management systems (which provide point solutions) are typically proprietary and are specifically tailored to one type of cryptographic equipment from one manufacturer. Additionally, existing key management systems tend to be highly user intensive. For example, distribution of key material to automated teller machines (ATMs) typically occurs via physical channels using two person control.
Traditionally, banks have addressed the key management needs for each banking service (e.g., ATM transactions, Electronic Funds Transactions (EFTs), etc.) as a separate and distinct consideration. As banks expand their set of services, however, to include, for example, remote “home banking” and remote deployment of cash machines, each of these services will also require different key management to support the cryptography involved in implementing the service.
FIG. 1
provides an exemplary scenario in which a conventional key management system is employed in a banking network. As shown, an acquiring bank
58
is in communication with an issuing bank
50
. Issuing bank
50
can be, for example, a bank in which a particular customer holds an account. Acquiring bank
58
can be, for example, a bank at which the customer initiates a transaction. For example, the customer might withdraw money from an ATM at acquiring bank
58
. Acquiring bank
58
communicates the transaction to issuing bank
50
so that the banks can reconcile the transaction between them. Acquiring bank
58
and issuing bank
50
can be the same bank, or different banks.
Typically, banks communicate with one another via a financial network
54
. Some well-known financial networks include Cirrus, Plus, S.W.I.F.T., etc. Financial network
54
facilitates the reconciliation of transactions between acquiring bank
58
and issuing bank
50
. As shown, issuing bank
50
is in communication with financial network
54
via a public switched telephone network (PSTN)
52
. Similarly, acquiring bank
58
is in communication with financial network
54
via a PSTN
56
.
As shown, acquiring bank
58
can be in communication with an ATM
76
, a home banking client
92
, a wholesale banking terminal
64
, and any number of other types of equipment. Preferably, acquiring bank
58
includes a wholesale server
60
that communicates via a PSTN
62
with wholesale banking terminal
64
. Wholesale banking terminal
64
can be a computer or other workstation via which a wholesale banking operator can control electronic funds transfers (EFTs) for example. Acquiring bank
58
can also include an ATM host
72
that communicates via a PSTN
74
with ATM
76
. Acquiring bank
58
can also include a home banking server
88
that interfaces via a communications network
90
with a home banking client
92
. Typically, communications network
90
is the Internet, although it could be any communications network, such as a LAN, WAN, or intranet.
To maintain privacy and security on the communications network just described, cryptography is typically employed to secure the communications links.
FIG. 1
shows the “disjointed” key management of each banking service when a conventional key management system is employed. That is, each banking service (ATM, EFT, home banking, etc.) makes use of a separate key management system that is dedicated to that service. The system as a whole, therefore, comprises a plurality of key management systems, each of which is separately maintained.
For example, wholesale server
60
is also in communication via a key management (KM) interface
66
with a wholesale KM system
68
. Wholesale KM system
68
is in communication via a KM interface
70
with wholesale banking terminal
64
. Wholesale KM system
68
manages (i.e., generates and distributes) key material for wholesale banking terminal
64
. Key material can include the key itself, as well as attributes that describe the key, such as its name, version, key type, expiration date, etc.
KM interfaces
66
and
70
can be separate physical interfaces, although, in general, they need not be. KM interfaces
66
and
70
are “virtual” interfaces, i.e., they can include any vehicle by which wholesale KM system
68
can manage key material to secure the communications link between wholesale banking terminal
64
and wholesale server
60
.
Similarly, ATM
76
is in communication via a KM interface
78
with an ATM KM system
80
. ATM KM system
80
manages the key material for ATM
76
. As shown, ATM host
72
can also interface with a network security processor (NSP)
82
. NSP
82
is in communication via a KM interface
84
with an ATM host KM system
86
. ATM host KM system
86
manages the key material for ATM host
72
. ATM KM system
80
and ATM host KM system
86
typically share key material. Typically, ATM key management requires two person, physical delivery. That is, each of two persons is required to physically deliver part of a “split” key to ATM
76
. In this way, KM interfaces
78
and
84
are not physical interfaces, but virtual.
As home banking typically occurs via the Internet, home banking server
88
is usually coupled to a secure sockets layer (SSL) accelerator
98
, which provides for secure communications over a public network such as the Internet. A home banking KM system
94
communicates via a KM interface
96
with home banking server
88
. Home banking KM system
94
manages the key material for home banking client
92
via KM interfaces
93
,
95
.
To date, the limited number of ATMs and electronic transaction interfaces has allowed the less comprehensive “point” key management systems to survive. With the explosion of remote ATMs (i.e., ATMs located in non-bank locations), the addition of numerous remote users, and the subsequent key management needs of each (i.e., each user requiring management of keying resources), the key management situation is fast becoming unmanageable. Additionally, the rapidity with which cryptographic algorithms become obsolete exacerbates the key management problem. It is well known that key management systems typically evolve from a cryptographic product; however, developers of key management systems typ
Hess Pennington J.
Howard, Jr. James L.
MacStravic James A.
DiLorenzo Anthony
Hayes Gail
L3-Communications Corporation
Woodcock & Washburn LLP
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