Data processing: software development – installation – and managem – Software program development tool – Translation of code
Reexamination Certificate
1997-06-16
2002-01-22
Chaki, Kakali (Department: 2122)
Data processing: software development, installation, and managem
Software program development tool
Translation of code
C717S152000, C707S793000
Reexamination Certificate
active
06341372
ABSTRACT:
FIELD OF THE INVENTION
The present invention relates to the creation and use of synthetic forms of existence, or androids, and more specifically relates to the development of a universal epistemological machine in which any forms of the universe, conventional technologies included, are represented, embodied and realized as eternal moments of an infinitely expanding continuum of enabled existential forms, as an alternative approach to resolving the problems of the human condition.
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
The science of androids concerns the creation of synthetic beings, or forms of existence that are made in the image of human being, though in capacities that extend far beyond those of human corporal form. The prior art of the present invention, therefore, is any technology that is alleged to be a thinking or perceiving machine—herein referred to as an epistemological machine—which includes, for example, robots and artificially intelligent computational electronic and biological machines.
If the basic goal of our human effort in classical approaches to the development of technology is considered, it can be observed that the replacement of human effort itself is a principal objective of even the simplest technological accomplishments, since the alleviation of the burdens of the intellectual and physical labors of human existence is evident even in our philosophies and religions guiding everyday life. Any example of a technology demonstrates this. The wheel, though only a primitive enhancement to the reduction of the physical labor of motion and power (transportation), changed, in its time, the cultural settings of entire civilizations in a contributory way, and built toward the displacement of human corporal form itself. In the post-modem era, the computer, an embodiment in physical matter of primitive grammatical language forms of what we know of the world around us—grammars referred to in the art as computations (algorinthms)—contributes toward the displacement of human corporal form by providing for the first time in history (save the abacus), for the ordinary person, the alleviation of repetitive intellectual tasks that can be defined in the languages developed for the art. Thus, whether we observe a monkey probing an ant hill with a stick to derive nourishment or a man walking on the moon, the underlying motivation of beings in regard to ordered reconstructions of the physical world (technology) is to displace themselves with machinery.
In history, however, implied in the nature of our institutions is the tenuous premise that human corporal form could not be wholly replaced—that is, to the extent that it is known. It is implied in our conventions that institutions themselves are a bounding form to a relatively fixed, finite universe of human beings. It is presumed in our traditional knowledges of the world that the knowing and perceiving of the world around us by human existence could not be augmented, as a technology, to unbounded proportions, expanding the existential universe indefinitely. As a result of this limitation accepted fatalistically in our conventional thinking, technology is viewed as a reconstruction of the physical and, with the advent of computers, the intellectual universe only in support of, not as a total replacement for, the knowledges and experiences of human beings under the existential premises of institutions. The information superhighway, for example, provides information for human beings within the constraints of our institutional thinking. It does not, however, provide information for ever increasing numbers of beings, beyond what population is considered to be the post-modern world or humanity. Computers themselves, moreover, embody what thoughts—and robots, what physical experiences—these finite numbers of beings in human civilization have had with respect to the reduction of human intellectual and physical labor by mimicking the thoughts and experiences, but nowhere is it expressly suggested in this art that computers and robots wholly replace the institutions of human beings that provide for their inception in the first place. Information superhighways, computers, robots and other technologies of the kind do not embody their own thoughts and experiences of the world. Rather, they embody the thoughts (and actions) of human beings dwelling under institutions of humankind. Automobiles, towering buildings, factories, appliances, and so on are technologies, or realizations of human existence, that are established in service to a relatively fixed and finite numbers of (human) beings bound together under various forms of institutions (business enterprises, governments, the world economy and so on).
In regard to the shortcomings of the prior art of the present invention, it can be appreciated that robots, artificially intelligent machines and, in general, factory automations (in technologies or workerless factories, which embrace the aforementioned) do not afford the real thoughts and experiences of human beings, as they are known and so defined in the humanities, in their methods or apparatus. Whether a computer is considered an embodiment of biological, electronic, or other media, including the historical apparatus of an abacus, it does not embody the capacities to know and to experience the world around us in regard to the use of any language in the cognitive, or conscious, recreation of reality, in a manner that our humanities define to be existence. The conventional art thus does not accomplish the creation of a being. This is evident in the prior art definitions of the words computation and thinking (or thought), since even most academicians who practice the art of computer science admit that by way of daydream, and not reality, the prior art of computation machines has come to embrace, spuriously, the word thinking, as an extension from what we think. By example, we can consider that if the symbol X were substituted for the word thinking in the language construction thinking machines, it would of course be prudent to define X in X machines before claiming that the machine is an X machine. The principle drawback of prior art thinking machines (also robotic technologies), is that the word thinking is not defined to accord sufficiently with our knowledges of the humanities when a computational machine or other similar methods and apparatus (artificial intelligence, expert systems, etc.) is claimed to think:
A computation of the prior art, for example, is an algorithm expressed in an arbitrary machine-realizable language; it is a syntactical expression of the transformations of the meanings of forms known and perceived in the experience of the observer, or programmer. One can know the meaning of a form, however, only in an existence. One thus must exist, in our comprehension of the word at least as defined by the humanities, in order to know meaning. When a computation is embodied in a machinery, the transformations of the meanings of the knowable and perceivable forms occur, in the machinery, relative to the existence who conceived the algorithm. While conventional machinery exists relative to the observer of it (the programmer or computer or robot maker), the machinery, most importantly, does not exist relative to itself—a fundamental tenet in definitions of existence stipulated by the humanities. When a computer—a material form of the universe—transforms in accordance with the syntax of a language defining an algorithm, it does not transform relative to its own knowable and perceivable experience of what the algorithm means. The machinery does not know and perceive the world around us as the observer, or programmer does. Rather, the computer or other similar device transforms as an objective form in the knowable and perceivable universe, or existence, of the programmer or computer maker. Thus, when a semantic network, neural network, expert system, inference machine or other artificially intelligent device transforms in the universe, it does not transform relative to its own existential or world experience. The use of the pronoun I in the
Chaki Kakali
Khatri Anil
LandOfFree
Universal machine translator of arbitrary languages does not yet have a rating. At this time, there are no reviews or comments for this patent.
If you have personal experience with Universal machine translator of arbitrary languages, we encourage you to share that experience with our LandOfFree.com community. Your opinion is very important and Universal machine translator of arbitrary languages will most certainly appreciate the feedback.
Profile ID: LFUS-PAI-O-2864924