Telephonic communications – With check operated control – Fraud or interference prevention
Reexamination Certificate
2001-05-17
2003-09-09
Barnie, Rexford (Department: 2643)
Telephonic communications
With check operated control
Fraud or interference prevention
C379S114140, C379S127020, C379S127010
Reexamination Certificate
active
06618475
ABSTRACT:
BACKGROUND
1. Technological Field
The present application relates generally to fraud control in telecommunications systems and, in particular, to preventing fraud in calls from a domestic origin point to an international terminating point in a long distance telecommunications network.
2. Description of the Related Art
The telecommunications industry has experienced significant changes in the way that customers are billed for their telephone calls. From the once simple method of billing the originating caller, many methods have been developed, allowing greater flexibility for the telecommunications customer. A predominant method for making telephone calls away from home or the office is by utilizing the telephone calling card to charge the call.
Calling card customers may use any telephone facility, including public facilities, to make a call that will be charged to their account. The process of making calls using a calling card typically includes dialing an “800” number, waiting for an audio prompt, and then entering an account number and a Personal Identification Number (PIN) into a telephone key pad device. The “800” (and now “888”) number phone calls are one type of a category of phone calls called “special service” calls. These special service calls, which include “700”, “800/888”, and “900” number calls, allow contemporary telecommunications networks to provide many services beyond direct distance dialing. It is the long distance carriers that provide this special service call processing, which allows for toll-free calls, calling card calls, special rate calls, etc.
Following the example of a calling card call, once the account number and PIN have been entered, the calling card customer can make one or more calls from whatever location the customer is dialing in from. These calls are subsequently charged to the customer's calling card account. Calling cards can also be used to avoid having to pay additional surcharges when making calls from certain public facilities such as hotels and telephone booths.
As with many new technologies, the ease and flexibility of the use of calling cards has led to abuse, and has consequently brought about new types of fraud. Calling card fraud costs businesses (and consumers) millions of dollars annually. Current security mechanisms, while effective, are not fail-safe, and protection mechanisms for consumers and businesses require improvement to stem these fraud-related losses.
There is a virtual underground industry in stolen calling cards and authorization codes. The multitude of ways that calling cards and authorization numbers find their way into unscrupulous hands need not be discussed here, but suffice it to say there is no end to the ingenuity of the criminal mind. One example of calling card fraud is the technique of “surfing” banks of public telephones, such as are at airports. Criminals “surf” by looking over the shoulders of legitimate card users as they key in the account number and PIN. Then they sell or distribute these numbers and rampant fraud results. In some cases, a single account may incur charges in excess of $100,000 in a single weekend. Calling card fraud and other forms of fraudulent use present pervasive problems for telephone carriers, particularly long distance carriers.
One method of fraud control is to simply remove calling card numbers against which it is suspected that fraudulent calls are being charged. In order to recognize fraudulent calls, a “billing number”—a billing product and an account number, such as a calling card, pre-paid phone card, etc.—is monitored over time. For example, where the number of domestic calls placed within a certain amount of time using the same billing number exceeds a certain threshold, an alert is generated. International calls may have a lower threshold so that fewer calls within the time period generate an alert. In addition, the threshold may be further adjusted for calls to countries where a high percentage of fraudulent calls are directed.
Another method of fraud control is to identify particular origin points that are linked to suspicious activity and to block certain calls from those particular origin points. For example, a large number of long duration calls to China may be generated from an exchange in Manhattan. This would generate a threshold alert, which is typically sent to a fraud analyst. A fraud analyst would be stationed at a fraud control console
100
, as shown in FIG.
1
. The fraud analyst analyzes the alert and the history of that exchange in order to determine whether or not to block that exchange from calling China. If the fraud analyst decides that there is fraudulent activity, he sets up a block on that exchange which will prevent subsequent calls to China or other international destinations that the fraud analyst selects.
The present invention concerns this type of blockage and, in particular, blocks on special service calls that originate domestically and terminate internationally. An example of this type of special service call is shown with reference to FIG.
1
. The caller, using telephone
111
, makes a calling card call by dialing a number in the format of 1-NPA-NXX-XXXX. NPA stands for Number Plan Area, often referred to as the “area code”, which defines the geographic region of the number; NXX is the terminating exchange, typically identifying a switch within the geographic region; and XXXX is the unique station designation. For most calling cards, the number will take the form 1-800-NXX-XXXX, where the “800” signifies that the call is a special service call, rather than a geographic region. The call is routed through Local Exchange Carrier (LEC)
120
. LEC refers to local telephone companies, such as the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs), which provide local transmission services for their customers. Because of the 1-800 format of the dialed number, the routers in the LEC will forward the call to the network of the appropriate long distance carrier (or Inter-Exchange Carrier IXC)
130
. Special service telephone calls, such as “800” number calls, are provided by IXCs, such as MCI-Worldcom.
Returning to our call, after switching through LEC switches
122
and
124
, the “800” number is routed from POP (Point-of-Presence) switch
125
into the IXC
130
, and then through IXC switches
131
and
136
, to a bridge switch
135
. The purpose of the bridge switch
135
is to receive calls from the IXC network and bridge them to the Automatic Call Distributor (ACD)
140
and, ultimately, into the Intelligent Services Network platform (ISN)
150
. Because special service calls require special call processing, they are typically routed to a call processing platform, such as the ISN platform
150
. There are a number of ISNs within the IXC, but, for the purpose of understanding the present invention, one ISN will suffice.
An exemplary and simplified diagram of the ISN platform
150
will now be described with reference to FIG.
2
. The ACD
140
is under the direct control of the Application Processor APP
156
, which is a general purpose computer that functions as the central point for call routing control in the ISN
150
. When the “800” number call arrives at the ACD
140
, the ACD
140
makes a request to the APP
156
for directions as to how the call should be handled. Such a request would usually be accompanied by information concerning the call; i.e. the Automatic Number Identifier (ANI) of the caller and the destination number of the call. The APP
156
would recognize by the “800” prefix of the destination number that the call is a special services call and, consequently, the APP
156
would instruct the ACD
140
to deliver the call to the appropriate queue. In this case, assuming that the call is to a calling card “800” number, the call would queue up to the Automatic Response Unit (ARU)
152
. The ARU
152
comprises two components, one to process the call, the other to prompt the caller with a voice response system. It is the ARU
152
that will ask the caller for the required final destination number, calling card number, an
Marchand Dean C.
Springer Arthur Lance
Barnie Rexford
WorldCom, Inc.
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